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Abstract 
Cognitive and gestalt visions theories consider incompleteness to be a necessmy and sufficient factor 
for inducing illusory figures. The role of incompleteness is studied herein by defining the inner logic 
subtended by use of the term "incompleteness", presenting new cases to clarify the phenomenology 
of incompleteness as a necessary and sufficient condition, and suggesting an alternative hypothesis 
to explain illusory figures after analyzing problems with the incompleteness hypothesis. It is 
demonstrated that incompleteness is not a sufficient condition, illusory figures do not necessarily 
complete incompletenesses, the shape of incompleteness does not predict the shape of illus01y 
figures, and incompleteness is not a necessmy condition. Finally, it is noted that the incompleteness 
hypothesis can be replaced by concepts concerning interacting boundary grouping and surface 
filling-in processes during figure-ground segregation. The suggested hypothesis is consistent with 
neurophysiological experiments and is described in terms of the FACADE neural model ofboundaty 
and surface formation during figure-ground segregation. 
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1. Introduction 
Why is it relevant to analyze the role of incompleteness in illusory figure fmmation? Incompleteness 
probes the general problems of organization of the visual world and object segregation. The 
organization problem is one of the most important problems in visual neuroscience; namely: How 
and why are a very large number of unorganized elements of the retinal image combined, reduced, 
grouped and segregated to create visual objects? Within the problem of organization, illusory figures 
are often considered to be one of the best examples to understand how and why the visual system 
segregates objects with a particular shape, color, and depth stratification. Understanding the role 
played by incompleteness in inducing illusory figures can thus be useful for understanding the 
principles of organization (the How) of perceptual forms and the more general logic of perception 
(the Why). To this purpose, incompleteness is here studied by analyzing its underlying organization 
principles and its inner logic. 
Incompleteness bas been proposed to be one of the basic factors in inducing illusmy figures. 
Indeed, some influential authors have hypothesized that illusmy figures are perceived if and only if 
the inducing elements are incomplete. Gregory (1972, 1987) suggested that illusmy figures are 
similar to perceptual hypotheses postulated to explain the unlikely gaps within stimulus pattems. 
This idea is derived from Helmholtz's Likelihood principle (Helmholtz, 1867). The well known 
Kanizsa's triangle (Kanizsa, 1955, 1979) would then be created by a top-down cognitive hypothesis 
to explain the gaps (missing sectors of the disks and missing parts of the outline triangle) within the 
stimulus. Similarly, Rock (1983, 1987) proposed that fragments similar to familiar figures elicit the 
cognitive hypothesis that a surface is occluding missing parts of inducing elements. Symmetry, 
incompleteness, interruptions, gaps, alignments among interruptions, familiarity, expectations and 
general knowledge are cues triggering the cognitive problem-solving process. Thus, in Kanizsa's 
triangle the alignment among gap terminations and the familiarity of the fragments would elicit a 
cognitive hypothesis of a tTiangle occluding three disks and an outline triangle. Coren (1972) 
considered the incompleteness of the stimulus as a depth cue that elicits the hypothesis of an 
occluding triangle. 
Starting from a Gestalt background, Kanizsa (I 955, 1979) suggested that the necessary factor 
for the formation of the illusory tTiangle is the presence of incompletenesses, or open figures, which 
activate amodal completion and closure processes that "create" complete perceptual elements behind 
a partially occluding illusory triangle. 
The role of incompleteness is studied in the next three sections by: (I) defining the inner 
logic subtended by use of the term "incompleteness", (2) presenting new cases to clarify the 
phenomenology of incompleteness as a necessary and sufficient condition, and (3) suggesting an 
alternative hypothesis to explain illusmy figures after analyzing problems with the incompleteness 
hypothesis. 
2. The logic and the paradox of "incompleteness" 
According to previous theoretical views, incompleteness was considered as a geometrical/structural 
factor that triggers illusory contour formation but, at the same time, as a perceptual property, 
beforehand, perceived as such and, afterwards, activating object hypotheses or completion processes. 
However, from a logical point of view if incompleteness is assumed as a geometTical factor: 
(i) it cannot be defined as incompleteness, because the term "incompleteness" implies a 
perceptual phenomenon and not a geometTical property; 
(ii) consequently, the use of the term "incompleteness" leads to the experience error (Kohler, 
194 7); that is, the implicit assumption that the structure of perceptual experience coincides with the 
optical array; 
(iii) furthermore, as a geometrical property it does not require any solution, explanation or 
completion; 
(iv) nevCJtheless, by assuming that incompleteness, open figures, or irregular elements can 
activate dynamical gestalt tendencies toward amodal completion and closure, as such, these 
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tendencies should show two states and not just one as they do: the preceding uncompleted and open 
state, and the succeeding completed and closed one. This is even truer for the cognitive hypothesis. 
However, only one state is perceived. Thus, as a geometrical property, incompleteness cannot be a 
cause of itself as a perceptual phenomenon that in its turn determines something else, the illusmy 
figure. 
If incompleteness is assumed as a perceptual property, it implies that: 
(i) as such it cannot be considered the cause of another perceptual property at the same 
epistemological level; that is, if incompleteness is perceived as incompleteness, there is no need to 
be discounted or completed to cause and elicit illusory figures, especially because incompleteness is 
in many cases a perceptual property independent from illusmy figures; 
(ii) it cannot be considered as such because as soon as it is perceived it is unperceived (reductio 
ad absurdum); 
(iii) thus, the incompleteness of a perceptual object cannot be perceived because once it is 
perceived it is immediately completed and explained; that is, it is first perceived as incompleteness 
and then completed: to be completed it should first be perceived as incomplete. This is paradoxical: 
In fact, it is not perceived if and only if it is perceived, or it is perceived if and only if it is not 
perceived (the paradox of "incompleteness"). The same paradox can be also stated as follows: To 
perceive an incompleteness that has to be explained and completed, first, it should become a 
conscious phenomenal property and, then, it should become unconscious so that its perceptual result 
is annulled or completed. In other words, the incompleteness is not perceived (completed) only if it 
is perceived (not completed); 
(iv) incompleteness considered as a depth cue implies that, as with all other depth cues, it should 
be perceived, but if it is perceived it is not perceived; thus, the argument is the same as that in point 
(iii); 
(v) therefore, if it is a perceptual property, it is not a perceptual property. In other words, 
incompleteness can never be perceived because it should be always completed. Said yet another 
way, incompleteness should never be perceived even under conditions independent from illusory 
figures. 
The previous arguments reject incompleteness as a factor for explaining illusory figure 
formation on the basis of merely logical reasoning. In the next section, the role of incompleteness is 
further weakened and redefined through new phenomenological conditions. 
3. Phenomenology of incompleteness 
The aim of this section is to argue phenomenologically that incompleteness is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient factor in inducing illusory figures. The demonstration of this statement follows four 
steps: (i) incompleteness is not a sufficient condition; (ii) illusory figures do not necessarily 
complete incompletenesses (reductio ad absurdum of the role played by incompleteness); (iii) the 
shape of incompleteness does not predict the shape of illusmy figures; (iv) incompleteness is not a 
necessary condition. 
In this section, the phenomenology of incompleteness is accomplished by demonstrating that 
gestalt principles of grouping and figure-ground segregation of boundary contour discontinuities and 
brightness inhomogeneities underlie, acting as parallel factors, the formation of illusory figures 
without invoking incompleteness. 
To demonstmte the phenomenological arguments, the spontaneous descriptions of subjects 
were recorded under the controlled conditions described in the next General Method section. 
3.1. General Method 
The stimuli were composed by the figures illustrated in the paper. The mean overall size of the 
stimuli was I 0.8 x 8.6 deg of visual angle. The luminance of the white (background) paper under our 
test conditions was 80.1 cd/nl. Black components had a luminance contrast of 0.97. Stimuli were 
presented on a computer screen under Osram Daylight fluorescent light (250 lux, 5600° K) and were 
observed binocularly from a distance of 50 em with freely moving eyes. 
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Different groups of twenty observers, if not otherwise stated, described only one stimulus. 
This was done to avoid the possibility that the perception of one stimulus might influence the 
perception of another. New experiments, not reported here, demonstrated that the following 
phenomenal descriptions could change by presenting different sequences of the stimuli. 
The subjects were naive as to the purpose of the experiments. All had normal or corrected-to-
nonnal vision. 
The subject's task was to report what they perceived by describing it. There was a training 
period preceding the experiment. During practice, subjects viewed some known figures from the 
illusory figure literature (e.g., Kanizsa's triangle, etc.). Observation time was unlimited. All the 
observers quite promptly repmted a description. Within the paper, if not otherwise stated, the 
reported descriptions contain the same words used by the subjects during the description of each 
stimulus and concern the phenomenal results obtained with a significant number of subjects ( ~15). 
The subject descriptions are repmted in italics and in quotation marks. In almost all studied 
conditions, the subjects were asked to sketch out what they perceived. Where necessary to clarify 
and specify the subjects' percepts, the results of the sketches are included. 
3.2. Incompleteness is not a sufficient condition 
The first phenomenological argument states that incompleteness is not a sufficient condition in 
inducing illusory figures. A condition A (incompleteness) is said to be sufficient for a condition B 
(illusory figure), if (and only if) the tTUth (existence or occurrence) of A brings about the truth 
(existence or occurrence) of B. In other words, A cannot occur without B, or whenever A occurs, B 
occurs. 
Even if the necessary logical condition cannot be easily disproved ·-namely, that all illusory 
figures contain incomplete inducing elements or that complete inducers cannot produce illusory 
figures (see Section 3.5), it can be easily demonstrated that not all occurrences of incomplete 
elements produce illusory ilgures (the sufilcient condition). Within previous models, the suftlcient 
condition is less interesting than the necessary one, but it is nonetheless important towards 
understanding the nature of incompletenesses and their organization. 
a 
c 
Figure 1. Conditions showing that 
incompleteness is not a sufficient condition 
and the role of gestalt principle of grouping 
of concave discontinuities: (a) an incomplete 
b square not inducing an illusory ilgure; (b) an 
irregular illusory amoeboid ilgure partially 
occluding four squares obtained by grouping 
incompletenesses; (c) by breaking the good 
d 
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continuation of (b) the illusory amoeboid 
largely disappears; (d) the articulation 
without rests factor segregates an illusmy 
ilgure invading and partially occluding the 
black square. 
Figure 1 a is au example of a phenomenal incomplete square not producing an illusory figure. It is 
interesting to notice that Figure 1 a is perceived simply as an "incomplete square with two missing 
parts curved inward on the lower-right side and on the corner". The tem1 "incomplete" is merely 
phenomenal. More specifically, this kind of incompleteness appears like a gnaw or a nibble. 
From an epistemological and logical point of view, the distinction between the term 
"incompleteness" and a mere geometrical term, like, for example, "concave discontinuities" of the 
contours of a square-like shape, is necessary: This geometrical property is not subjected to the 
previous logical arguments and paradoxes. At the same time, the expression "concave discontinuity" 
can also have a phenomenal meaning. The concave discontinuities are perceived, but they do not 
require any completion and, more generally, they do not tend to any other perceptual state. Thus, 
from an epistemological and phenomenological point of view, it can be stated that: "geometTical 
concave discontinuities, such as those illustrated in Figure la, induce the perception of an 
incomplete square". 
By saying "concave discontinuities", our aim is not to define incompleteness. Instead, the 
term "concave discontinuity" highlights the role played by discontinuities along the boundaries that 
may be said to include incompletenesses, and that can be related to principles of grouping and 
figure-ground segregation. For example, if a concave discontinuity region segregates from other 
boundaries, because of similarity (or dissimilarity), they can group with similar concave 
discontinuous boundaries, as illustrated in the next figures. The replacement of incompletenesses 
with "concave discontinuities" is not considered either in geometrical or in phenomenal terms, but as 
a dynamic process of grouping and figure-ground segregation. It allows us to overcome the logical 
and phenomenal critiques that can be made against the term "incompleteness". Furthermore, it 
allows one to suggest hypotheses that are not restTicted to illusory figures and that are basic for the 
segmentation and organization process of vision. This alternative way to consider incompleteness 
will be clarified below. 
Concerning the result of Figure 1 a, in defense of the cognitive and Kanizsa hypotheses, one 
can say that the reason why the incompleteness in Figure 1 a does not induce an illusory figure is that 
the incompleteness shown does not need to be completed. Since this implies that incompleteness is 
not a sufficient factor, such examples elucidate the role played by incompleteness and, more 
pmticularly, the problem regarding under what conditions concave discontinuities are perceived as 
incompletcnesses or as illusory figures. Thus, if incompleteness is not a sufficient factor, then the 
specific question is: Under which geometrical conditions does incompleteness get completed, as 
suggested by Gregory, Rock, Coren and Kanizsa? A possible answer to the question is illustrated in 
Figure 1 b, where by arranging the incompletenesscs of four squares similar to the one in Figure 1 a in 
a grid, "an irregular illusory amoeboidfigure partially occluding four squares is perceive{r. 
By comparing these conditions with those in Figure 1 a, the classical laws of organization in 
perceptual forms, as described by Wertheimer (1923), seem to play a basic role: "incompletenesses" 
or concave discontinuities group on the base of proximity, closure, similarity of contours and good 
continuation factors, creating an amoeboid shape. Therefore, by breaking their good continuation, as 
in Figure lc, "the illusory amoeboid largely disappears". The roles of the closure factor and, in 
addition, of the articulation-without-rests factor arc shown in Figure 1 d. The curved line is the rest, 
included within the whole organization, assuming "the perceptual role of the boundary of the 
illusory .figure invading and partially occluding the black square". A similar result is obtained in 
Figures 2a and 2b. 
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Figure 2. Different roles of incompletenesses in different form organizations: (a) an incomplete 
(gnawed or nibbled) black polygon; (b) an illusory white paste, as painted with a tempera, in the 
outer and inner edge of the polygon; (c) and (d) non-homogeneous paintings across and along the 
inducing elements. 
Figure 2a appears as "an incomplete black polygon, whose incornpleteness is perceived as an erased 
part of the polygon", while Figure 2b appears as "an ill us my white paste, as painted with a tempera, 
in the outer and inner edge of the polygon". In Figure 2a, differently from Figure 2b, "very weak or 
no illusory contours are perceived outside the pol)'gon". It is worth highlighting that the 
incompleteness of Figure 2a assumes a specific form: "Deletion or erasure". As a consequence, 
from a phenomenological point of view it is not a mere incompleteness but "something" at a more 
specific level and different from the previous incompletenesses: "A gnaw or a nibble". Therefore, 
according to cognitive and gestalt models, the term incompleteness is an undetermined property that 
can assume a large number of forms. This uncertainty further weakens the phenomenological role 
played by incompleteness as considered by gestalt and cognitive models. As can be observed in 
Figures 2c and 2d, "the illusory figures appear as non-homogeneous paintings across and along the 
inducing elements~'. 
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Figure 3. Gestalt grouping principles as alternatives to incompleteness: (a) the word ART is 
perceived due to similarity/dissimilarity in the type and shape of the boundaries composing the R 
letter; (b) the illusory R emerges due to surroundedness and past experience principles; (c) the line 
separating the component of the R within the T weakens the emergence and segregation of the word 
ART and the R does not appear as an illusmy figure; (d) The word ARTE is perceived and theE 
letter pops out due to past experience, surroundedness, good continuation, convex discontinuities 
along the T letter, closure and articulation without rests; (e) and (f) due to proximity factor mutilated 
or incomplete 0 and the G do appear in front of Vs or, alternatively, two holes having V shapes 
partially showing a black background and a white 0 and G partially perceived through them. 
Incompleteness can be reconsidered in the light of gestalt grouping principles even when it appears 
as a different and independent factor. In Figure 3a, "the word ART is perceivecf' (Pinna, 1990). The 
similarity/dissimilarity in the type and shape of the boundaries composing the R letter as well as the 
grouping of concave discontinuities, due to the good continuation principle, can be responsible for 
the perception of tbe word ART. In conjunction with similarity, the surroundedness principle of 
figure-ground segregation (Rubin, 1915, 1921) and past experience (WCJtheimer, 1923) likely 
influence the pop out of the R letter. "The illusory R appears in .fi-ont of the A and the T, that each 
completes itselfamodall)l". 
8 
The role of past experience is more obvious in Figure 3b, where the similarity/dissimilarity 
principle is weakened and where the incompleteness within the T groups with the empty space 
between A and T, that by virtue of the surroundedness principle tends to appear as a figure. The 
surroundedness principle is working as well within the component R that can be considered as the 
incompleteness ofT, which in its turn can be considered as a concave discontinuity that is a special 
case of the concave grouping principle (Wertheimer, 1923). It is interesting to note that "the R 
appears on the same plane of the A, while partially occluding the T'. 
In Figure 3c, "the word ART emerges again but less strongly than in Figure 3b". The 
presence of a line separating the component of the R within the T, and the empty space between the 
A and the T, together weaken the grouping of the R and favor the amodal completion of the former 
component behind the latter. "1/w R does not appear as a clear illusory figure, even when it is 
clearly recognized". 
In Figure 3d, "the word ARTE (Italian for ART) is now rea{f'. The letter E is perceived 
despite the absence of incompletenesses or local concave discontinuities of the R. On the contrary, 
on its right side the T presents convexities or additions. Both R and E pop out from the background 
as figures, acquiring clear figural qualities. "The letter E emerges fi-om a black (upper-right and 
/ower-1~/i corner.\) and white (upper-1~/i and lower-right corners) square that appears as a 
backgrowuf'. "TheE appears with curved boundaries". The perception of theE and its background 
demonstrates that the boundaries belong unilaterally to the illusory E. The E letter pops out as a 
figure likely because of the following principles: past experience, surroundedness, good 
continuation, convex discontinuities along the T letter, closure and articulation-without-rests. 
Despite the fact that perception of the four alphabetical letters seems to be ruled by different figural 
principles, they group together making the reading of the word ARTE easy. 
Because the convex discontinuities along the right side of the T are the opposite of the 
concave discontinuities on the left side that can be considered as the low-level description of the 
incompleteness, the illusory E letter is induced from something that is the opposite of 
incompleteness; i.e., convexities or additions. 
Illusory figures are not completed in Figures 3e and 3f (Cocco, Pinna & Spillmann, 2000), 
where the best expected solutions to the incompletenesses on the basis of past experience are two 
black Vs, partially occluded, and an illusory 0 and G in front of them. However, "illusory contours 
are not perceived in the outside edges of the Vs" (20 out of 20 subjects for each stimulus). "771e 0 
and the G do appear in Font of' Vs, but only partial!v because they are seen as incomplete or 
mutilate<f'. Other possible percepts are "two holes having V shapes partially showing a black 
background and a white 0 and G partially perceived through them" (12 out of 20 subjects for each 
stimulus). 
These results suggest that grouping and figure-ground segregation principles play an 
important role in the explanation of illusory figures and, more specifically, in the understanding of 
their perceptual organization. However, by grouping "incompletenesses" through the synergistic 
combination of several principles, an illusory figure is not necessarily perceived (Figures 3e and 3f). 
How and whether it forms may depend on factors that are linked to grouping principles. In Figure 
4a, the three corners of a virtual triangle are not grouped to produce an illusory triangular contour 
across the white space between the circles. Rather, the percept is typically of "a white triangle 
partia/(y perceived through three holes in a white swface on a black backgroumf'. "The disks 
become circular holes and their boundaries belong to the white su1:face, while their black color 
completes itself amodally becoming a homogeneous black background'. "1'lle white space becomes 
a punched SU(face partial()' occluding a white triangle". The effect is similar to the ones induced by 
Figures 3e and 3f, but it is interesting all the more so because each circular inducing element is 
perceived as an incomplete disk, not as a circular hole, when presented separated from others. It 
demonstrates the basic role of grouping principles that create emergent figures with new properties 
not reducible to the local components. 
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Figure 4. A special case of proximity factor 
induces: (a) a white triangle pattially perceived 
through three circular holes in a white surface 
on a black background; (b) an illusory tTiangle; 
(c) an illusmy triangle is perceived even when 
the good continuation factor is weakened. 
Furthermore, these results demonstrate that, even if incompletenesses are aligned to favor good 
continuation, even if closure, proximity, and pragnanz factors work synergistically, even if the 
boundary contour of the triangle is thin enough to induce a strong figural effect (surroundedness and 
proximity principles of figure-ground segregation; Rubin, 1921 ), no illusory triangle may be created 
(Figure 4a). The opposite is perceived when viewing Figure 4b, where, by increasing the width of 
the boundary contours of the corners, "an illusory triangle is clearly perceived', even if the grouping 
factors are weakened or pitted against it (Figure 4c ). 
Figure 5. Variations in the ratio between the 
width of each interruption and the distance 
between the successive radial lines induces no 
illusory circumference in (a), a strong illusory 
annulus in (b) and not any illusory 
circumference in the right side of (c) but only 
disjoint bright interruptions or dashes, while 
the opposite is true in the left side of the (c). 
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The same argument is illustrated in Figure Sa, where bright spaces, interrupting each ray 
(incompleteness as interruption) in approximately its center, create "a circumference that is virtual 
but not illus01y". In fact, "the spaces may appear as disjoint bright spots on the radial lines" (13 out 
of 20 subjects). However, "the lines do not look like holes, as in Figure 4a, and the spots do not 
complete themselves amodally behind the white swface". This result is interesting in the light of the 
following possible counterargument, using Figure 4a, to the critique of incompleteness. This 
counterargument states that, even if in Figure 4a an illusory triangle is not created, the reversed and 
complementary effect (disks as holes, illusory triangle as amodal triangle, etc.) is induced as an 
object hypothesis that can fill and explain the gaps within the stimulus pattern. Thus, the amodal 
triangle should represent the perceived solution to the incompleteness within the circular holes. 
Figure Sa provides a counterexample to this counterargument because "it does not complete the spots 
or bright interruptions, as does happen by increasing the width of the circumference in Figure 5b". 
Without invoking the role of incompleteness, the factor that differentiates the percepts in 
Figures Sa and Sb is the ratio between the width of each interruption and the distance between the 
successive radial lines. By increasing the width of the amodal triangle of Figure 4a as in Figures 4b 
and 4c, or of the virtual circumference of Figure Sa as in Figure Sb, this ratio changes accordingly. 
All else being equal, by decreasing the distance (angle) between tbe radial lines, the completion of 
the bright interruptions becomes more likely and stronger, thereby creating an illusory 
circumference. As illustrated in Figure Sc, "the right side ()[the figure does not show any il/us01y 
circumference but only di~joint bright interruptions or dashes, while the opposite is true in the 
figure's l~fi side". 
The perceived difference between the left and right sides of Figure Sc is strong enough to 
overcome any tendency of good continuation to weaken the difference between the two sides and 
enhance the perceptual grouping. This ratio property is a special type of the proximity factor, which 
pits horizontal versus vertical proximity against each other. 
In summary, from a phenomenological point of view, one need not invoke completion 
processes of incomplete inducing elements to explain the previous results. They can be more easily 
explained in terms of perceptual grouping factors, suitably understood. In particular, it is not 
necessary that an illusory figure completes both local and global incompletenesses. Both these 
arguments are topics of the next section. 
3. 3. lllusmyfigures do not necessari~y complete incompletenesses 
In Figure 6a (Pinna, 1990), "a square matrix, made up of small squares with a missing element in the 
leji upper corner", is perceived. This is perception of "incompleteness" without an illusory figure 
(not sufficient condition). In Figure 6b, "the square matrix appears again incomplete but with an 
illtiSOIJ' bright square larger than the black ones and not occluding anything". The occlusion of one 
small square is more an inference than a perceptual result. Furthermore, "the fiJUr crossed black 
squares, all around the largest bright one, do not appear incomplete or partially occluded' even 
though they are connected through T-junctions with the illusozy square (as reported by the subject 
through a sketch) and are pairwise-colinear, which is a basic constmint that often leads to amodal 
completion. One may argue that the perceived incompleteness is global; i.e., of the square matrix 
and not of single black squares. Even if it were so, "the square matrix does not appear completecf'. 
To be completed, a small square should be perceived behind the illusory large square, that "does not 
appear occluding anything even if it is tangent to the sides c!ffour black squares all around, that in 
their turn do not appear incomplete or partially occ/udecf'. To sum up, Figure 6b is a case of 
incompleteness that is not completed by an illusory square neither locally nor globally. This result 
represents a logical confutation of the role played by incompleteness if incompleteness is considered 
as the neccssaty condition. 
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Figure 6. Incompletenesses are not necessarily completed by illusory figures: (a) a square mall·ix 
with a missing element in the left upper corner; (b) an incomplete square matrix with an illusory 
bright square larger than the black squares and not occluding any element; (c) a square frame made 
up of black squares (control condition); (d) an illusory bright square occluding a black cross (control 
condition). 
These perceptual results are particularly interesting even in the light of Figures 6c and 6d. By 
annulling the global effect of the matrix·· that is, by leaving the just square frame around the large 
white square of Figure 6b, as illustrated in Figure 6c· neither the illusory figure nor the 
incompleteness is perceived, but "onlv a square .fiame made up of' black squares". This result 
implies a global effect of the grid on the illusory figure formation in Figure 6b. By comparing this 
result with the one of Figure 6d, where the squares in the corners of Figure 6c are missing, another 
perceptual result emerges: "an illusmy bright square occluding a black cross". Under these 
conditions, "the black squares complete themselves amodally in a cross partially occluded by a 
large illusor)l white square". This result is not perceived in Figure 6b and demonstrates that even 
complete squares can induce an illusory figure, contrary to theories that assert a necessary role for 
incompleteness. 
However, a counterargument in favor of these theories states that, when the illusory figure is 
perceived, the inducing elements complete themselves amodally in a more global figure different 
from the geometrical inducing elements. Within this couuterargument, incompleteness becomes an a 
posteriori result that can be defined and known only after the perception of the illusory figure. This 
kind of reasoning implies the same paradoxes defined in Section 2. Nevettheless, even accepting the 
logic of this counterargument, it is phenomenologically weakened by the perceptual result of Figure 
6b, but it will be more definitively rejected in Section 3.5, when more probing counterexamples will 
be shown. 
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Figure 7. Figure-ground principles induce: (a) an illusory rectangular stripe behind the four black 
central squares; (b) an illusory diagonal of five squares demarcating the separation between the two 
halves of an incomplete square matrix of squares; (c) a large bright square with four black squares in 
its inner edges arranged along the arms of a virtual cross or, alternatively, five bright squares at the 
same plane of the black small squares all around them; (d) a large bright square. 
Figure 7 (Pinna, 1990) reports two conditions phenomenologically in agreement with the previous 
results: "an illusory rectangular stripe behind thejimr black central squares" (Figure 7a), and "an 
illusory diagonal of five squares demarcating the separation bet'rveen the t1vo halves of an 
incomplete square matrix of squares" (Figure 7b). Note that "the illusory stripe of Figure 7a does 
not occlude any square, rather appears coplanar to the other squares on its sides above and belm·v, 
yet appears behind the four black squares contained in its surji1ce". Figure 7c shows two alternative 
results: "a large bright square similar to the one perceived in Figure 7d, with filar black squares in 
iL\' inner edges arranged along the arms (~fa virtual cross"; and '~five bright squares at the :wane 
plane ol the black small squares all around them". These alternative percepts emphasize the role 
played by figure-ground principles in inducing illusory figures. 
The perceptual results of Figure 8 differ from those of Figure 6 in that "incompletenesses" 
are here accompanied by illusory figures similar to "scribbles rJl white tint in .fi"ont of one entire!v 
occluded (Figure 8a) or some partially (Figure 8b) occluded squares". In the experiment, 12 out of 
20 subjects reported that, in Figure 8a, "the scribble does not occlude the entire missing square at 
the corner, but only partially the three around it". 
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Figure 8. Different roles of incompletenesses in different form organizations: scribbles of white tint 
in front of one entirely occluded (a) or some partially (b) occluded squares; (c) the scribble lies 
behind the crossed white bars of a window showing the dim interior of a room; (d) the inner irregular 
white shape, similar to the body of an insect, appears in front of the partially occluded crossed bars 
while its legs appear intertwined in the bars. 
The "scribble" perceived in Figure 8c, even if related to incomplete squares, "appears to lie behind 
the crossed white bars r!{a window showing the dim interior o{a room". This result is similar to the 
one described in Figure 4a. In Figure 8d, the inside edge of the scribble of Figure 8a is totally white 
and the ratio between distances is changed, so that phenomenally "the inner irregular white shape, 
similar to the borzv of an insect, appears in Font o{the partially occluded crossed bars while its legs 
appear intertwined in the bars". Here, the bars are both occluded and occluding, depending upon the 
ratios. 
On the basis of these results, the question is: Which are the inducing elements, the bars or the 
squares? If incompleteness is a necessary factor, then the question has a paradoxical answer: The 
effect is cause of its cause. In other words, the incompleteness of the bars and not of the squares can 
be decided only a posteriori and it becomes the cause of the perception of the incompleteness of the 
bars and not of the squares. This is paradoxical only if incompleteness is considered a necessary 
factor. However, this criticism has in the next Section 3.4 a further logical and phenomenological 
aspect from a different point of view. The new question is: Incompleteness of what? 
3. 4. The shape of incompleteness does not predict the shape of illusory.figures 
Once the geometrical shape of "incompleteness" has been defined, can the shape of the illusory 
figure be predicted? More particularly, does the shape of the illusmy figure correspond to the shape 
of incompleteness? And does the shape of the illusory contours agree with the shape of real contours 
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when these complete the shape of the same incompleteness? Many experimental data demonstrate 
the equivalence of illusory contours with real ones. Jllusory contours are like real contours in: 
producing geometrical illusions (Fame, 1968; Pastore, 1971; Gregory, 1972; Bradley and Dumais, 
1975; Bradley and Petry, 1977; Meyer and Garges, 1979); in beiug enhanced by kinetic depth 
information (Bradley and Lee, 1982); in being subjected to apparent and stroboscopic motion 
(Sigman and Rock, 1974; Griinau von, 1979; Ramachandran, 1985); in producing figural after-
effects (Smith and Over, 1976, 1979; Meyer and Phillips, 1980); in being used as targets or masks in 
visual masking experiments (Weiss ten et a!., 1974; Reynolds, 1981 ); and in serving in information-
processing tasks as a landmark aiding the localization of elements in visual space (Pomerantz et a! 
1981). Von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner (1984), and Peterhans and von der Heydt (1987) 
found that neurons in CO!tical area V2 of macaques respond at locations where illusory contours are 
perceived. These neurons respond with a similar slightly delayed excitatory response to both illus01y 
and real contours that crosses their receptive fields, and both real and illusory contours produced 
similar orientation tuning in these cells. 
a 
b 
Figure 9. Illusory figure shape differs fi'om the shape of the incompleteness. (a) An elongated or 
double lemon-like 8 amodally interweaved behind two single lines that appear curved is perceived 
despite the gaps correspond to three circles (b). 
Despite these results, Figure 9 demonstrates differences between the two kinds of contours. In Figure 
9a, a parallel distribution of horizontal lines encloses three circular gaps vertically arranged. 
However, they do not appear like three adjacent illus01y circles but as "a double 8 amodally 
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interweaved behind two single lines that appear curved'. Furthermore, "each circular shape of the 8 
appears elongated or distorted with a shape similar to a lemon". The "real" geometrical shapes of 
the incompletenesses, shown in Figure 9b to be "three circles", do not correspond to the shapes of 
these illusmy figures. 
The main point is: Why should three circular gaps be completed as described if the simplest 
figures that can solve the problem of incompleteness are three illusory circles? The complexity of 
the solution of the 8-like shapes, including their amodal completion, is far from being considered as 
the simplest solution. The general question raised by this figure is the following: If incompleteness is 
assumed to be a necessary factor, is it possible to predict the shape of the illusory figure that is 
induced to complete a gap in the simplest possible way? Figure 9a shows that the answer is No, and 
thus that real and illusory contours do not necessarily match. 
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Figure 10. Illusion of angularity: the shape of the illusory figure concords with the shape of 
incompleteness, but real contours don't. (a left) An illusory disk····· (a right) the circle appears to be 
polygonal with blunt angles directed towards the inside of the stripes. (b left) an illusory polygon ·~ 
(b right) the sides of the polygon look convex with swellings inside the stripes and the vertices 
appear less pointed, blunter, and rounded off. (c left) an illusory polygon-- (c right) the polygon 
appears more polygonal, pointed or sharper with the polygon sides appearing slightly concave and 
the vertices seeming to go even more inwards into the stripes. 
Figure 10 sets the inverse problem: the shapes of illusory figures here are in agreement with the 
gaps, but, by completing the gaps with real contours, the perceived shapes do not match with the 
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ones induced by the illusory figures. In Figure 1 Oa left, "an illusmy disk" is perceived filling the 
circular gap in the center of radial stripes. By replacing the illusory contours with real ones (Figure 
lOa middle), the "illusion of angularity" is perceived (Figure lOa right, Pinna, 1991). "The circle 
appears to be polygonal with blunt angles directed towards the inside of the stripes". When the gap 
is a polygon with each vertex lying between two contiguous stripes, "an illusory po!ygon", similar to 
the gap shape, appears (Figure 1 Ob left). But when it is replaced by real contours (Figure 1 Ob 
middle), "the sides of the polygon look convex with swellings inside the stripes". "The vertices 
appear less pointed, blunter, and rounded off' (Figure 1 Ob right). By viewing globally, "the polygon 
appears more circular than the real circle" illustrated in Figure 1 Oa right. If the gap is a polygon 
with vertices lying within the black stripes (Figure 1 Oc left), "an illusmy polygon is perceived". But, 
when it is replaced with real contours (Figure 1 Oc middle), "the polygon appears more polygonal, 
pointed or shmper with the polygon sides appearing slightly concave and the vertices seeming to go 
even more inwards into the stripes" (Figure 1 Oc right). On the basis of these results, the question is: 
If the illusmy figure is the solution to the problem created by the gaps, then why by replacing 
illusory with real contours -that is, by adding a real solution to the gaps- does the phenomenal shape 
appears different? 
CJ)J 
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Figure 11. Inadequacy of incompleteness to predict how gaps should be completed. (a) A 
circumference with two missing arcs; (b) the white gaps become "something" (neither an illusory 
figure nor a gap) that allows one circumference to pass behind the other; (c) "something" that induce 
the incomplete circumference to be amodally completed behind the complete circle; (d) the amodal 
completion is less strong than in (b) and (c); (e) the gaps become the white illusory boundaries of the 
circumferences that appear as surfaces. 
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A demonstration from another point of view of the scientific inadequacy of incompleteness in 
predicting how gaps should be completed is shown by the illus01y contours illustrated in Figure II. 
A circumference with two missing arcs, as illustrated in Figure II a, is not completed, but rather 
appears "broken even ![within the gaps some weak brightness induction is perceived". By inserting 
an identical circumference intersecting the gaps (Figure II b), the white gaps are not perceived 
anymore as such but they become "something that allows one circw>!ference to pass behind the 
other", that is "the incomplete circwnference is amodally completed behind the complete circle". A 
similar effect is perceived in Figure II c. What is this "something" is hard to define phenomenally, 
maybe an "illus01y amodal completion". It is not an illusory figure in the known sense; "it is not an 
illusory contour; it belongs to neither one nor the other circle; it does not appear as a gap or as 
incompleteness". This illusory amodal completion "is comparable or even stronger than the one 
illustrated in Figure 1 hf'. By increasing the amplitude of the gap, the strength of the amodal 
completion and the depth stmtification effects increase accordingly. 
By increasing the width of the woven circumferences and by decreasing the amplitude of the 
gaps (see Figure lie), the illusory amodal completion persists but it assumes a different appearance: 
"The gaps become the white boundaries of the circumferences that appear as surfaces". Note that 
"the bright illusory boundaries are perceived only along the crossover point.s' and not eve1ywhere 
along the circumferences". They are "illus01y" in the sense that they are detached from the real 
black region that they bound. These figures show that the real contours define a preferred orientation 
for attaching parallel illusory contours to their figure, even though these illusory contours, 
perceptually speaking, are real contours in the figure that bound, and thus complete, the black figures 
from which they arc detached. In other words, these illus01y contours define T-junctions with respect 
to the real contours from which they are detached. Again, these perceptual results and these 
phenomenal variations cannot be predicted from incompleteness as a sufficient condition for 
explaining illusory contour formation. 
3. 5. Incompleteness is not a necessary condition 
The most important logical condition to be studied is incompleteness as a necessary condition; that 
is, A is necessary for B if B cannot be true unless A is true. Consequently: 
(i) if the inducing elements are complete, then no illusory figure should be induced or, in other 
words, a case of complete elements inducing an illusory figure can never happen. 
Within the logical rationale of cognitive and gestalt models, incompleteness is completed through 
depth segregation and amodal completion. Some consequences follow: 
(ii) Whenever an illusory figure is perceived, necessarily the depth segregation of the illusory 
figure relative to the inducing clements, and their partial occlusion should be also perceived. 
(iii) There should never be the case of an illusory figure on the same depth plane (coplanar) to its 
inducing elements. 
At least three attempts have been made to disconfirm the necessary condition. One of them is 
the "Sun effect" by Kennedy (1976, 1978). By using triangles pointing towards a central open area, 
Kennedy demonstrated that illus01y brightness can occur without amodal completion of the inducing 
elements. This is an interesting counter-example but does not completely disprove the role of 
incompleteness and completion. In fact, in the Sun effect, the illusory contours are perceived not as 
sharp boundaries but fuzzy ones, and the resulting brightness does not have the surface qualities of 
the Ehrenstein illusion, but rather appears diaphanous like a bright fog without defined depth 
segregation. Thus, this percept might be considered as a case of acute terminators inducing fuzzy 
illusory contours. 
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Figure 12. Illusmy figures without incomplete inducing elements: (a) Each letter is perceived 
complete, but their radial arrangement induces a strong illusory circle. Furthermore, the illusory 
circle is perceived coplanar and tangent to the letter terminators. The illusory circles persist even 
when each letter is upside down (b), tilted in 3D space (c) and when both the inducing letter and the 
illusory contours are misaligned (d) and deformed ( e and f). 
Purghe (1990) suggested another interesting case to refute the necessary condition. He arranged four 
black octagons in a way that the central illusmy octagon appears that is tessellated to the other four 
all around it. This limiting case of amodal completion uses implicit Y -junctions between the illusory 
figure and the inducing elements. The strongest refutation of the necessary condition would contain 
T -junctions between the inducing elements and the illusory figure. 
By modifying the Ehrenstein figure, Ehrenstcin (1941), Pinna (1996), and Pinna eta!. (2004) 
investigated whether illusory figures are affected by cognitive cues that do not allow amodal 
completion. This was done by replacing Ehrenstein inducing lines by alphabetical letters (either 
normal or modified) with similar line terminators (Figure 12a and 12b ). The perception of the letter 
of the alphabet requires a cognitive process defining the completeness of it. "Each letter is perceived 
complete, but their radial arrangement induces a strong illusory circle", thereby contradicting rule 
(i) whereby incompleteness as a necessary factor. Rules (ii) and (iii) are also contradicted, since "the 
illusory circle is perceived coplanar and tangent to the letter terminators". "An illusory disk with 
shw7J contours is perceivecr' even if curved terminators (R and B) and line-end terminators are 
mixed. 
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The three rules are refuted even by rotating Figure 12b in 3D space as illustrated in Figure 12c. "The 
strength and sharpness of illusory contours and the coplanarity of the ill us my disk are here even 
stronger than previously". The illusmy figure persists even when there are misalignments and 
deformations both in the inducing letter and in the illusmy contours (Figure 12d, 12e and 12!), or 
even if the letters of the alphabet appear incomplete due to their bottoms being cut in the shape of a 
disk. 
These various results indicate that incompleteness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for inducing illusory figures, and indicate the need for a different explanation. However, 
incompleteness carries the idea that illusory figures make the understanding of the general problem 
of figural organization easier. This is an impmtant point to be considered and included within such 
an alternative explanation. These are topics of the next section. 
4. The hypothesis of figural organization of local inductions of contours and brightness 
The questions to answer in this section are: How can the previous results be interpreted? Can the 
incompleteness hypothesis be replaced by a new hypothesis that overcomes the previous logical and 
phenomenological problems of the incompleteness theories? Section 3.2 showed the role of grouping 
and figure-ground segregation principles in inducing illusmy figures. It is proposed below that these 
principles involve both boundw;' contour discontinuities like the wiggly concavities of Figure 1, as 
well as brightness inhomogeneities that are induced along the same wiggly concavities or at line 
terminators (Figures 5, 9, II, 12). The line terminators are a special case of boundary contour 
discontinuities, because of the abrupt change in contour direction. These two factors clarify the more 
general problem of figural organization, where illusory figures still play a leading role. The next 
sections propose how to overcome inadequacies of the incompleteness hypothesis in explaining 
figural organization in terms of how percepts are completed in response to boundary contour 
discontinuities and brightness inhomogeneities. 
4. 1. Figural organization of' boundary cm1tour discontinuities 
The problem of figural organization has his roots in opposite qualities of figure and background 
(Rubin, 1915, 1921) that depend on a phenomenal scission between figure and background and, 
more generally, between object and reference frame (Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1920; Metzger, 1963); 
namely: (i) a border is unidirectional, and belongs to the flgure (border ownership), not to the 
background; (ii) a figure possesses a bright, compact, and opaque surface color, whereas a 
background shows a diaphanous color and appears empty; and (iii) a figure appears to lie above the 
background, whereas the background is unlimited and continues underneath the figure. 
These points are illustrated in Figure 13. Consider the "electric plug-like shape" of Figure 
13a, showing two additions, and the "halfcircular shape" of Figure 13b. When they are put 
together, as shown in Figure 13c, "a clear illusory E is perceived and the whole pattern is read as 
DED". "1'l1e two Ds appear on a white background, while the E is perceived on a black 
background'. "No incompletenesses are present in the component elements". They can be defined 
only after the illusory flgure is perceived, but this implies a paradox as has already suggested. 
Instead, convexities and additions, clearly perceived in Figure 13a, are not anymore perceived as 
such in Figure 13c, because their boundaries there belong to the E and not to the plug-like shape, in 
Figure 13a, and thus they become background. 
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Figure 13. Figure-ground organization of boundary contour discontinuities. (a) Electric plug-like 
shape; (b) half-circular shape; (c) by putting together (a) and (b) a clear illusory E is perceived and 
the whole pattern is read as DED; (d) an illusory E is perceived; (e) an illusory 5 digit emerges; (i) 
an illusory number 2 on a black background or, alternatively, an illusory 2 on a black background 
with two adjacent I letters on both sides of the 2 digit. 
Similar examples useful for a comparison of the strength of the illusory letters are illustrated in 
Figme !3d and l3e, where convexities and additions are complementary to concave discontinuities 
and gaps. "711e illusory E is clearly perceived in Figures 13d and the illusory 5 in Figure 13e". 
While "the concave discontinuities (for example the three white arms of the E in Figure !3d) tend to 
appear as a figure", "the convex additions (for example the two black additions to the Din Figure 
!3d) are grouped and perceived as a black backgroumr'. Because the same border can be perceived 
both concave and convex depending on the direction of the perception - that is, from the left to the 
right or from the right to the left - the border of the two boundary conditions belongs to 
complementaty regions. It is worthwhile noting that the two black additions to the D in Figure !3d, 
perceived as a black background, are not perceived as additions anymore and, as a consequence, they 
split from the D, thus inducing "two illusmy vertical boundary contours that separate the two 
regions and that belong to the D". These illusmy contours disappear when the electric plug-like 
shape is perceived. 
These examples illustrate that the problem of illusory figures can be considered as pa1t of the 
more general problem of figure-ground organization, notably of how boundaries are grouped and 
ungrouped in a way that is sensitive to figure-ground constraints. Figure-ground organization plays a 
role in illusory figure formation even if the effects of past experience are weakened. In particular, 
grouping and ungrouping can influence border ownership of the ungrouped boundaries. For 
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example, in Figure 13f, the perceptual results were described as (i) "an illusmy number 2", and "an 
illusory reflected S both on a black backgroun(f' or (ii) alternatively "an illusmy number 2 on a 
black background with two adjacent I letters on both sides of the 2 digit (12I)". The inducing 
elements, observed separately, can be phenomenally described as "two small horizontal rectangles, 
each connected to two larger vertical rectangles". The percept of a 2 on a uniform black background 
depends on the grouping of the small horizontal rectangles with the two larger vertical ones. The 
percept of I2I is facilitated by the ungrouping of the small rectangles from the larger ones, due to the 
discontinuity in the directions of their boundaries, thus eliciting the illusory contour formation in 
between them, as described in Figure 13d. This ungrouping makes the perception of the illusmy 2 
easier, enabling the small rectangles to lose their boundaries to the illusmy 2 digit and enabling the 
large rectangles to appear as such or as I letters, in agreement with past experience through cognitive 
priming of the 2. 
These phenomenal results show that the role of incompleteness can be similarly explained in 
terms of boundary contour grouping processes and figure-ground organization, as they apply to the 
perception of illusory figures. Such an analysis avoids the paradoxes raised by "incompleteness" as 
an explanatory principle, yet also provides explanations of the phenomena that motivated this 
hypothesis. In particular, boundary contour grouping principles: 
(i) are not restricted to specific figural conditions like incompleteness but cover multiple 
boundary contingencies, including additions, line terminators, and parallel contours (see in particular 
Sections 3.5 and 4.1); 
(ii) incorporate both local and global boundary conditions, as illustrated in Section 3.3; 
(iii) do not necessarily require amodal completion of inducing clements (Sections 3.3 and 3.5), 
but can induce illusory figures without amodal completion; 
(iv) can predict opposite and complementary figure-ground organizations, as shown in Section 
3.2; 
(v) predict the shape of illusory figures on the basis of the grouping oflocal discontinuities and 
their connections (Sections 3.2 and 3.4). Thus the shape of illusmy contours is not necessarily equal 
to the shape of real contours and to the shape of incompleteness. 
The figural properties of the illusory figures are accompanied by brightness enhancements 
along with the illnsory figures that cannot be accounted for solely by the organization of brightness 
discontinuities. Both boundary grouping and surface filling-in processes work in parallel, indeed arc 
represented by parallel cortical interblob and blob streams from cortical areas Vl through V4, to 
synergistically create the strong figural properties of real and illusory figures. The modeling articles 
of Grossberg (1994, 1997), Grossberg and Mingolla (1985a, 1985b), Grossberg and Swaminathan 
(2004), Kelly and Grossberg (2000), and of Raizada and Grossberg (2003) propose and simulate 
cortical mechanisms of perceptual grouping and figure-ground perception whereby these properties 
may be realized; see Section 5. 
4.2. Figural organization r~f brightness inhomogeneities 
In Figure 14a, "the radial stripes appear partial!)! occluded by an illusory bright annulus". By 
replacing the illusory contours with real ones (see Figure 14b), "the annulus loses its large 
brightness enhancement, although weak brightness enhancement persists within the interspace 
between the stripe terminators". Furthermore, as in Figure 10, "the inner and outer circles of the 
annulus appear as pointed arcs wedged in the black strips", illustmting the illusion of angularity 
(Pinna, 1991 ). "In Figure 14c, the brightness enhancement is stronger than in Figure 14b", due to 
the pairs of lines that continue the boundaries of the stripes within the interspaces. In Figure 14d, by 
bordering the annulus with real contours, "the induced brightness next to the stripe terminators pops 
out relative to the dark connecting regions within the annulus". "The brightness and darkness 
inductions are contained in separated sectors of the annulw·;". Due to this separation, "they are 
enhanced compared to Figure 14c". Functioning as both filling-in generators and filling-in barriers 
(Grossberg, 1994, 1997), the separation lines stop and contain both the brightness filling-in (see 
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Figure 14a) and the darkness filling-in (see Figure 14b) along the annulus. By widening the 
brightness area, as illustrated in Figures 14e and 14f, "the brightness and darkness spreading effects 
are diluted, though not homogenously", as in the Kanizsa and Minguzzi (1986) anomalous 
brightness differentiation and impossible staircase (Escher, 1961; Penrose and Penrose, 19 58) 
brightness illusions, respectively, both of which are simulated in Grossberg and Todorovic (1988) by 
using boundmy and surface interactions. 
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Figure 14. Figural organization of brightness inhomogeneities. (a) The radial stripes appear 
partially occluded by an illusory bright annulus; (b) the annulus loses its large brightness 
enhancement, although weak brightness enhancement persists within the interspace between the 
stripe terminators; (c) the brightness enhancement is stronger than in (b); (d) the induced brightness 
next to the stTipe terminators pops out relative to the dark connecting regions within the annulus; (e) 
and (f) the brightness and darkness spreading effects are diluted, though not homogenously. 
The conclusions suggested by these phenomenal results are the following: 
(i) Brightness induction peculiar to illusory figures is elicited whether or not there are figural 
incompletenesses (Figures l4b-l4f); 
(ii) brightness enhancement is induced next to each stripe terminator; 
(iii) brightness inhomogeneities are induced independently from the presence of illusory or real 
contours; 
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(iv) brightness inhomogeneities spread and fill long distances (Figures 14a and 14b); 
(v) brightness spreading can be contained by both illusory and real boundaries (Figures 14a-14e) 
acting as barriers; 
(vi) among brightness inhomogeneities, darkness enhancement may be perceived, especially 
when a real boundary separates the respective regions (Figure 14d); 
(vii) bright and dark inhomogeneities mix while they spread (Figures 14a, 14b, 14f) if they are not 
separated by boundaries. 
The amount of brightness and darkness induction changes by replacing illusory with real 
contours but in a manner that does not depend upon incompletenesses. "Going from Figure 14a to 
Figure 14b, the decrease of brightness" may not depend on the completion of the gap, but rather on 
darkness assimilation due to the parallel black lines among the radial stripes. Figure 14d supports 
this hypothesis. Here, the assimilation effect is enhanced due to the presence of the pairs of 
perpendicular parallel lines enclosing the darkness assimilation regions and separating them from the 
brightness induction areas. The hypothesis of darkness induction due to assimilation processes may 
be only part of the explanation of the perceptual result of Figure 14d. In fact, it appears similar to the 
dark spots perceived at the crossroads of the Hermann grid and within the circular anangement of 
triangles or zigzag elements of Kennedy's Sun Effect. This hypothesis deserves further experimental 
attention. 
Figure 15. Chromatic assimilation effect. Surface processing occurs parallel to boundary formation, 
and its properties do not necessarily derive from figural incompleteness: (top) brightness 
enhancement conspicuously fills the central gaps between the radial lines (Ehrenstein illusion); 
(middle) when black rings are superimposed onto the illusory disks, the brightness enhancement 
largely disappears; (bottom) however, when colored annuli replace the black rings, an effect much 
brighter than in the Ehrenstein illusion occurs with a dense appearance comparable to a paste of 
bright and quasi-luminous white color added to the surface of the paper. 
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These examples of brightness induction, among others (Brigner & Gallagher, 1974; Frisby & 
Clatworthy, 1975; Day & Jory, 1978; Jmy & Day, 1979; Grossberg, 1983, 1984, 1987a; Grossberg 
& Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b, 1987), illustrate that surface processing is a distinct process that occurs 
parallel to boundmy formation, and that its properties do not necessarily derive from figural 
incompleteness properties. Figure 15 illustrates this conclusion in a vivid way. In the classical 
Ehrenstein illusion (Figure 15, top), "brightness enhancement conspicuously .fills the central gaps 
between the radial lines". Ehren stein (1941) showed that, when black rings are superimposed onto 
the illusmy disks, "the brightness enhancement largely disappears" (Figure 15, middle). This 
property is in agreement with incompleteness theories. However, when wide colored annuli (e.g. 
purple, as in Figure 15, bottom) are used that replace the black rings, brightness cancellation does 
not occur. Instead, it produces "an effect much brighter than in the Ehrenstein illusion. The white 
disks also show a dense appearance comparable to a paste of bright and quasi-luminous white color 
added to the sw:face of the paper" (Pinna eta!., 2003). 
The cases illustrated in this section demonstrate that boundary and surface formation 
processes are parallel, distinct, but mutually interactive processes that together give rise to figure-
ground segregation properties. Indeed, brightness inhomogeneities are especially induced next to 
line terminators (e.g., Figures 9a, I Oa 12), as well as concave (e.g., Figures I b and 2) and convex 
(e.g., Figure 12a and 15) boundmy discontinuities. 
5. Conclusions 
According to cognitive and gestalt theories, incompleteness was considered as a necessary and 
sufficient factor for illusory figure formation. The role of incompleteness has herein been studied in 
terms of its inner logic and through a phenomenological analysis of new cases. It is shown that 
incompleteness is neither sufficient nor necessary to induce illusory figures. These problems are 
eliminated when the incompleteness hypothesis is replaced by concepts concerning interacting 
boundary grouping and surface filling-in processes during figure-ground segregation. These 
interactive boundary grouping and surface filling-in dynamics give rise to the three basic figure-
ground properties (phenomenal scission between figure and background, see Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 
194 7, Metzger, 1963): the unidirectional belongingness of boundaries to the illusory figure, not to 
the background; the enhanced brightness of surface color under certain conditions; and the illusory 
figure lying above a background that continues underneath the illusory figure. 
Compared to the logical and phenomenological problems coming from the incompleteness 
hypothesis, advantages of this new dynamic hypothesis are: 
(i) Incompleteness becomes just one property to be explained, similarly to illusory figures, in 
terms of boundary and surface dynamics; 
(ii) boundary and surface dynamics are not restricted to properties of incompleteness, and are 
thus not subjected to incompleteness paradoxes; 
(iii) boundary formation processes can handle other kinds of discontinuities than incompleteness; 
(iv) surface and boundary processes can explain both local and global levels of object 
representation, including both bottom-up and top-down levels of object representation. 
The suggested hypothesis is consistent with neurophysiological experiments. Von dcr Heydt 
eta!. (1984) and Peterhans and von der Heydt (1987) demonstrated that neurons in area V2 of the 
monkey cortex are respond to both real and illusory contours. Sasaki and Watanabe (2004) reported 
distinct fMRI signatures in the human visual cortex for illusory contours and for color spreading 
processes, including color spreading in VI. Zhou et a!. (2000) found a substantial fraction of cells 
that are sensitive to border-ownership in area V2; cf., Section 4.1. Baylis and Driver (2001) found 
that neurons in monkey IT (inferotemporal) cortex, which are supposed to be involved in object 
recognition, respond differentially to figure or ground, and as a consequence to border ownership. 
Kleinschmidt et a!. (1998) in fMRI studies on figure-ground reversals found activation over a 
number of areas in occipital, temporal, parietal and even frontal cortex. fMRI studies of Kanizsa 
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squares by Hirsch et al. (1995) revealed that there was activation of the occipital cmtex lateral to Vl 
where signals related to segmentation were present. Mendola et al. (1999) found that signals related 
to illusory contours were observed in cortical area V3 and also in LO, the lateral occipital area 
(Malach et al., 1995). 
The FACADE neural model of boundary and surface formation during figure-ground 
segregation (Cao and Grossberg, 2004; Grossberg, 1994, 1997; Grossberg and Howe, 2003; 
Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997; Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; Grossberg and 
Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; Kelly and Grossberg, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003) provides a 
conceptual foundation with which to replace hypotheses about incompleteness with new perceptual 
and neural organizational principles and mechanisms that are not subject to the problems of the 
incompleteness hypotheses and which have begun to provide explanations of the types of data that 
have been summarized herein. Various of the percepts induced by Figures I - 15 can be explained 
by using FACADE model mechanisms that were described and simnlated in Grossberg (1994) and 
Kelly and Grossberg (2000). Several such explanations are sketched here to illustrate this claim. 
Some of the percepts illustrate how Petter's principle (Petter, 1956) is realized by FACADE 
grouping and figure-ground mechanisms. For example, the percepts in Figures 4, 5, and 8c can be 
explained by the fact that bipole grouping cells (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b; Raizada and 
Grossberg, 2003) form real and illusory boundaries via long-range excitatory connections and 
shmter-range inhibitory connections. Some of the shorter-range inhibitory connections ensure that 
the groupings form inwardly between pairs or greater numbers of (almost) collinear contours. Other 
inhibitmy connections suppress weaker boundary groupings at nearby positions and at different 
orientations and depths. 
In response to Figure 4a, boundary completion can occur between the exterior contours of the 
black disk that arc interrupted by the thin white triangular shape, since the excitatory connections 
that group over the thin white shape have a high support ratio (Shipley and Kellman, 1992). In 
contrast, completing a collinear boundary is much more difficult between the aligned contours of 
two thin white triangular shapes that belong to different black disks. Here the support ratio is much 
smaller for the corresponding bipole cells. When the shorter-range inhibitory connections of the two 
classes of bipole cells compete, the boundaries within the circular disk win. This event is enough to 
trigger the figure-ground percept of a triangle that is partly seen through three circular holes in a 
white surface. The explanation is the same as the one given and simulated for Kanizsa stratification 
in Kelly and Grossberg (2000). 
A key step in this explanation is based on a prediction made in Grossberg (1987b, 1994, 
1997) that the stronger boundary can break the weaker boundary where it abuts the stronger 
boundary, thereby creating a gap in the weaker boundary. This step triggers depthful figure-ground 
percepts through a feedback interaction between boundary and surface representations. This 
hypothesis has been useful in explaining many figure-ground data, most recently data about how the 
visual cortex generates 3D transparency and neon color spreading percepts (Grossberg and 
Yazdanbakhsh, 2005). The predicted boundary breaks may change perceived brightnesses due to the 
spreading of contTast, through the boundary gap, between contiguous surface regions. Percepts of 
bistable transparency provide a particularly useful way to test this hypothesis, since focusing 
attention on the boundary of one region can cause its surface to be seen in front of the other region, 
and should cause a perceived change in brightness. Shifting attention to the boundary of the other 
figure can cause its surface to be seen in front, again with a perceived change in brightness. Tse 
(2005) has recently reported just such a perceived brightness change during percepts of bistable 
transparency. 
Figure 4b greatly improves the support ratio of the bipole cells that group collinearly across a 
pair of black disks, since the pac man inducers are considerably larger. In addition, thickening the 
white triangular regions greatly weakens the support ratio of the bipole cells that might attempt to 
complete a boundary around each black disk. In particular, the small triangular black regions that lies 
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between the thicker white bars provide very little suppmt for completing a boundmy across each bar. 
Thickening the white regions also makes the orientations of successive contours in the black region 
differ more. All these factors work together to enable the collinear grouping into a triangle to occur. 
This event triggers the percept of a triangle in front of partially occluded disks, again with the same 
explanation as Kanizsa stmtification. Figure 4c has a similar explanation. Figures Sa and 5b have an 
explanation that is similar to that for Figures 4a and 4b. Figure 5c combines several of these factors 
by altering the relative support ratios in the left and right sides of the figure. 
Several of the figures probe the properties of the bipole grouping kernel, which was designed 
in Grossberg and Mingolla (1985b) to already include properties that were later called relatability by 
Kellman and Shipley (1991) and associationfieldby Field, Hayes, and Hess (1993). For example, in 
Figure I b, the irregular bounding contours in each pair of contiguous black figures are relatable, and 
are capable of causing boundary completion across the intervening white regions. These boundaries 
can then pull the figure thereby formed forward and the black regions backwards, by the same 
mechanisms as in Kanizsa stratification, thereby leading to a percept of an irregular figure in front of 
four partially occluded black squares. Figure 1 c supports this interpretation by making the irregular 
contours unrelatable. Figure ld, the case of "articulation-without-rests", again enables illusmy 
contours to form with respect to the two exterior irregular boundaries and the two ends of the rests. 
This case of boundary completion depends upon the fact that line ends generate a band of inducing 
orientations that are almost perpendicular to the line orientation (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985b ), a 
fact that is crucial in generating the illusmy circular boundary in the Ehrenstein illusion of Figure 
l5c. Once these illusory contours are formed, the same figure-ground mechanisms operate again. 
Various cases in Figure 2, notably Figures 2b, 2c, and 2d, have similar explanations. So does Figure 
7a. 
The explanation of the percept derived from Figure l b also raises the issue: Why do we not 
see the illusory bounding contour of the central figure? This property can be explained by the fact 
that "all boundaries are invisible" within FACADE theory (Grossberg and Mingolla, !985b; 
Grossberg, 1994). That is, boundaries pool over opposite contrast polarities at each position, hence 
cannot discriminate between dark and light. They do this in order to create complete boundaries of 
objects that are seen in front of textured backgrounds whose relative contTasts with respect to the 
object reverse as the object boundary is traversed. This pooling of opposite contrast polarities occurs 
at complex cells of cmtical area VI. Boundaries become visible when they separate surfaces that fill-
in different surface lightnesses, brightnesses, or colors. In Figure 1 b, any such difference in filled-in 
surface lightness or brightness is small between the irregular figure and the background white 
regiOns. 
The main differences between Figure 9a and 9b can also be explained by how boundary 
relatability and figure-ground properties interact. In Figure 9a, the horizontal lines that separate the 
circular open regions generate boundaries which are stronger than the illusory boundaries that bound 
the open regions. FACADE mechanisms explain how these horizontal boundaries can be seen in 
front. In particular, the horizontal boundary that is seen in front inhibits possible redundant copies of 
itself at the same positions but further depths. This across-depth inhibition is part of the surface-to-
boundaty feedback that is used in all FACADE figure-ground explanations. In this case, the surface 
is the black filled-in representation of the line itself. Such surface-to-boundary feedback ensures that 
perceived boundary and surface representations are consistent, even though the laws that they obey 
are complementmy (Grossberg, 1994). Figure-ground separation is predicted to be a consequence of 
this consistency operation. Because the redundant copies of the horizontal boundary are inhibited at 
further depths, the illusory contours of the circular regions can complete behind it via relatability 
constraints, thereby completing the double 8 percept that is amodally perceived behind the horizontal 
lines. 
The percepts in Figure 14 can be explained using some of the same ideas that Grossberg and 
Todorovic (1988) used to explain and simulate Kanizsa-Munguzzi (1986) anomalous brightness 
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differentiation and the impossible staircase (Escher, 1961; Penrose, 1958). One idea is that all 
brightness and darkness inductions combine when filling-in occurs within a bounded region. In 
Figure 14a, these are brightness inductions that are generated within the annular region by the black 
radial stripes. These brightness inducations are trapped inside the illusory annular boundaries, and 
can fill-in freely throughout the annulus. 
In Figure 14b, the situation is more complicated due to the existence of the black circular 
contours that bound the annulus. Here, the black radial stripes can again cause brightness induction. 
However, the boundaries that are fanned at the stripe-annulus edges are stronger than the boundaries 
that are fmmed by the thin black annular bounding lines. Whenever a stronger boundary collinearly 
abuts a weaker boundary, a boundary weakening or even a gap can form at the end of the weaker 
boundary, just as in the case of figure-ground separation that was discussed above. One can see the 
effects of such boundary gaps in percepts such as neon color spreading, where part of the 
explanation concerns how they are formed by sudden changes in boundary strength (Grossberg and 
Mingolla, 1985a). In the present case, some darkness spreading occurs from the black lines into the 
annular region. The brightness and darkness inductions spread during filling-in within the annulus, 
leading to a darker percept in response to Figure 14b than Figure 1 4a. 
The fact that the brightness enhancement is greater in Figure 1 4c than Figure 14b has a 
similar explanation, but here the weaker line boundaries are collinear with the stripe edge 
boundaries. Figure 14d prevents the brightness inductions from spreading through the annulus, as in 
Figure 14b, but combines darkness inductions from weaker line boundaries that are collinear with 
the ends and the sides of the st1·ipe edge boundaries. Figures 14e and 14fsupport the hypothesis that 
the brightness and darkness inductions can spread within their bounding contours. In particular, 
Figure 14fis a version of an impossible staircase. 
These explanations illustrate how FACADE concepts about 3D boundary completion and 
surface filling-in, particularly as they lead to 3D flgure-ground percepts, can be used to replace 
concepts about incompleteness without leading to any logical paradoxes. Percepts such as those 
derived from Figures 3 and 13 can be explained using similar mechanisms, with the addition that 
top-down attention to familiar letters from inferotemporal recognition categories can also influence 
the pre-attentive grouping process. !-low such pre-attentive and attentive factors may combine to 
enhance attended groupings is reviewed elsewhere; e.g., Grossberg (1999) and Raizada and 
Grossberg (2003). 
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